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RAGMATISM is America's contribution to philosophic thought.
It characterizes our approach to problems-be they scientific, industrial, or governmental. Generally we go about solving these problems
unhampered by the burdens of dogma. We are practical and realistic.
In sports we see our football coaches try to circumvent the rules"avoidance" is the term coined by the tax counsellors, I understandcausing the rule-makers to scramble, often unsuccessfully, in an attempt
to keep up. And if we want more hits in baseball, why we "liven up"
the ball!1
In government, this approach has given us a structure which is the
very antithesis of what the theorist would characterize as a political
order. Order implies dearly fixed principles of operation and development. It implies fairly distinct hierarchies of authority. It implies
some clearly defined values and goals and some degree of symmetry
in the structure of government. Our public administration is hardly
hampered by any such confining concepts. Nothing is more obvious than
this lack of direction on the part of our administrators. Burdened by
a morass of detail, a good deal of which is probably unnecessary busywork, they are ignorant of the precise nature of the public interest which
they are charged to protect 2
We are problem solvers. The Army has one kind of task and
*A.B. 1947, Yale University; LL.B. ix,5i Harvard University. Associate Professor of Industrial and Labor Relations and of Law, Cornell University. Member of
the Michigan bar. This article is a slightly modified version of a paper delivered
at the Administrative Law Round Table) Association of American Law Schools, in
Chicago, Illinois, in December, i96i.
' I appreciate that this is a point controverted by baseball manufacturers!
'Compare a recent analysis of these failings in Miller, The Public Interest Un.

defined, io J. PuB. L. 184 (1961).
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consequently is set up in one way. The Post Office is another matter
and can be organized and staffed quite differently. The courts are
something else again, and if they do not perform well in labor cases,
we simply fix up another kind of agency to deal with labor cases. We
do the same with unfair trade cases except when there is a special problem with the marketing of corporate securities, and then we set up a
separate agency for that kind of advertising.
Our pragmatism has spawned a sprawling governmental organism
held together by about as much skeletal underpinning as an amoeba.
We are fond of calling this off-spring, its growth, its operation and its
convulsions "the administrative process." And the lawyers have a
special concern with the legitimizing element in this process, namely,
administrative law-that odd, wonderful hybrid of constitutional law,
procedure, and public administration. But many people are concerned
over the directions which both the administrative process and administrative law have taken. Or perhaps it is more accurate to say that it
is lack of direction with which we are most concerned.
Let me add that I am fond of administrative law. It has performed
more admirably than perhaps we had a right to expect in the face of the
political practicalities with which it has had to contend during the last
half-century. Administrative law has served as the conscience of our
administrative process. It has continued to make a tenacious attempt to
fix unto the process of public administration some minimal ordering
principles of constitutional government. One need but remember Kent
v. Dulles' or Green v. McElroy4 to see the point.
Notwithstanding, it has been a losing battle. The pressures leading
to the multi-directed accretions to the bureaucratic establishments have
been too immediate and too continuing to allow for any kind of firm fix
on some constellation of constitutional principles. Indeed, both the
advocacy of change, as well as the resistance to it, have tended to lead
to the same result. The advocates of change want something new.
The resistance they encounter results in tinkering, in compromises, and
in narrowly particular solutions. And our untheoretical and pragmatic
way of doing things has prevented us from focusing on broad questions of
governmental theory. Or, if we do occasionally focus on those questions, it is with the object of winning a law suit. This is probably unavoidable, given our constitutional structure and tradition. But it may
not always be the best forum in which to conduct a constitutional debate.
8357 U.S. xx6 (958).

436o U.S. 474 (0959).
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It was not always true of our political practitioners that theory of
government was irrelevant to the political process. Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, Morris and the rest, albeit highly
realistic political practitioners, knew what political theory in the grand
sense was about. More importantly, they were sharply conscious of
what the practical consequence of implementing a particular political
theory was likely to be. Their constitutional and political dialogue was
a continual blending of philosophy and practice.5
Thus, in erecting our governmental structure, they showed a nice
appreciation of the needs of centralism in the face of a splintered society.
At the same time, they recognized both the fairness and efficacy of some
division of governmental functions and powers. Concededly, this is
all very elementary civics and, so one might suggest, happily forgotten
with the invention of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the
decline and fall of the Schechter case.6 But my point here is quite
modest. Our basic governmental structure is based on political theory
and philosophy. If it represents problem solving, it was problem
solving resting on a coherent framework of political principle-not just
random playing with administrative and political blocs. I am suggesting that the framers of the Constitution, despite their political and
philosophic differences, had firm notions of the kind of society they
wanted. That being the case, they addressed themselves sharply to
the problem of building a governmental apparatus appropriate to such
a society. Their focus was, I think, on fairness, on efficiency, and most
especially on liberty.
The same cannot always be said about our developing governmental
apparatus during the recent decades. Much of the evolution of the administrative process has been characterized by the element of randomness.
This has been the consequence of our unfocused pragmatic approach,
the difference between pragmatism and opportunism in government
and politics often being more apparent than real. This, in turn, has
largely diverted our attention from the long-run aims of governmentfairness and efficiency. This leads to the somewhat paradoxical conclusion that opportunistic pragmatism, except in the short run, may
not work very well, at least in government.
a See, e.g., BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL paS$n (1916); BOWERS,
JEFFERSON AND HAMILTON PassZin (19z5); BOWERS, JEFFERSON IN POWER passim
(1936); OLIVER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON PaSsiln (19o6).
The list could, of course,
he long continued.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

295

U.S. 495 0935).
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Let me make these observations more concrete. The rise of the
commission movement is in virtually each instance traceable to some
particular problem of economic or social policy which existing instruments of government seem ill-equipped to handle. Since the problem
always has some special characteristics, dictates of practical necessity
seem to call for a special instrument of government peculiarly designed
to deal with these characteristics. This mollifies the opponents of
change and regulation, because isolation of the problem and isolation
of the instrument for its solution present a situation which can, both
in the short run and especially in the long run, be contained. The
solutions are specialized, limited, and temporizing. Thus, we have
seen created separate commissions to deal with discriminatory railroad
rates, other unfair methods of competition, unfair labor practices, and
so forth.
The proponents of regulation are at the outset, of course, pleased in
each separate instance because they have a stick purposefully designed
to fit the size and shape of the head of some particular whipping boy.
But the story of the tiring policeman, even if he is a specialist, lacking
refular re-infusions of the blood of political responsibility, is too
familiar to repeat here.7 Suffice it to say that the proponents of regulation through the administrative process, operating on principles of
immediate practicality, may have lost sight of some fundamental
political truths. What the proponents of regulation, in their haste to
solve the immediate problem, fail to do is to explore with imagination
the possibility of accomplishing their aim within the existing framework of government. Perhaps the mistake is -to assume that, because
that framework has failed to solve the particular problem, it is in some
way fundamentally defective. In any case, whatever the reason, the
approach seems generally to be the creation of a new and typically
independent agency, rather than the enhancement, either in size or,
which would be more important, in authority, of an existing governmental organ.
What has happened, in effect, is a failure to maintain the original
constitutional architecture by modifications appropriate both to the
changing needs of increasingly national markets and politics, and to
the principles on which that architecture rested. As citizens and con7

Itis well told in BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMIS(1955).
One hopes that Professor Bernstein's more recent call for more empirical work will not result in inundation. Bernstein, The Regulatory ProceSS: A
Framework for Analysis, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROR. 329, 335 (1961).
SION
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sumers our paramount interest is in fairness and efficiency. Yet the
piecemeal solutions to specific problems have all too often proven
violative of both interests. Had we remained true to the cause of
fairness and efficiency, we would have changed our system of legislative
apportionment and representation to allow for viable regional and
effective metropolitan governmental units, capable of coping with the
advance of technology, trade, transport, communication, and the mushrooming city. We would thereby have insured genuine protection of
citizen and consumer interests, instead of drifting more and more,
toward a system of producer-oriented instruments of government. We
would also most likely have minimized the shift of power from the
legislative to the executive branch. Finally, we would have avoided
the repeated patchwork efforts to meet these problems-efforts which
became easy captive to the producer groups they are designed to
regulate. Failure thus to remain true to principle has enabled varying
producer interests to exploit the failings of the original structure to
contend with arising problems of technological and economical evolution. The developing corporate system, for instance, exploited the inappropriateness of the state as a licensing agency, as is dear in the
whole history of competitive laxity in chartering. Who would doubt
that we would have a more sensible, simpler, fairer, and more effective
governmental structure had we early enacted a National Companies
Act, strictly delimiting rights, powers, and duties of interstate corporations. Little regulation beyond the Sherman Act would have been
necessary, if that.
Instead, we embarked on a course of producer-oriented but seldom
citizen and consumer-oriented, tugging and pulling which is well illustrated in the labor relations field. When, in 1935, the question of
administration of the Wagner Act arose, the choice was made in favor
of a new and independent National Labor Relations Board rather than
of the office of the Secretary of Labor. The subsequent history of that
Board is revealing and illustrative. The Board, because in its early
days it was a vigorous agency, encountered heavy resistance and counterattacks from the regulated groups. The focus was upon the issue of
improperly mingled functions and consequent unfairness. Concern
over the NLRB, as well as over some of the other federal agencies,
eventually produced the Administrative Procedure Act8 and the TaftHartley Amendments separating the General Counsel from the
a 6o

Stat.

237

(1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001-1ol1

(1958).
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Board.' As a temporizing compromise, the accomplishments of the
Administrative Procedure Act have been minimal. We know how
difficult it is to tell where the act changed, and where it codified preexisting practice.1" The impact of the organizational Taft-Hartley
Amendments was also at best unimpressive; at worst, it created confusion." The subsequent disillusionment with the National Labor Relations Board has been striking. When the Federal Labor Reform Law
of 195912 was under consideration, no one from any part of the political
and economic spectrum seriously suggested that the new act be administered either by the NLRB or by some other independent regulatory agency. Rather, the law is enforced by the Secretary of Labor, the
Department of Justice, and the courts. And lately even trade union
lawyers are talking of turning unfair labor practices adjudications over
to the courts!
This shows that the opponents of the regulatory process, like its
proponents, are largely motivated by considerations of practical short-run
advantage. Those who opposed the NLRB in its early days were not
really concerned with effective and fair government. In the course of
purporting to make regulation "fair," they rendered it ineffectual.
The sad story told by the Landis Report'" shows how far this process
of deterioration has gone. Whether it be the National Labor Relations
Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Power
Commission, the Federal Communications Commission, the Civil
Aeronautics Board, or the Federal Trade Commission, the fact seems
to be that, with but very few exceptions, none of them has been doing a
more than barely adequate job and some considerably worse than that.
The conclusion seems inescapable that the competing pressures toward
'Sec.

(d), 6x Stat. 139 (x947),

29

U.S.C. § - 5 3 (d) (x958).

3
"Compare, e.g., American President Line, Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Board, ixz
sath
w953)i
Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. McKay, zz5
F. Supp. 346 (D.D.C.
F.zd 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (x955).
" See Klaus, The Taft-Hartley Experiment in Separation of NLRB Functions, ix
IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 371, 379 (1958). As a solution to the difficulties engendered
-by the present compromise, more complete separation of executive and judicial function
was recently suggested by an Advisory Panel on Labor-Management Relations Law,
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Report on Organization and Procedure of the National Labor Relations Board, S. Doc. No. 81, 86th Cong., d Sess.
(196o).
"Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. Sig ('959))
z9 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (Supp. I, 1959).

"STAFF

or SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., 2D SEss., REPORT ON

REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 196o).
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effective regulation, on the one hand, and toward fairness to the regulated, on the other, have produced a situation where we have achieved
neither goal.
Our approach has not only bequeathed us a process of public administration seriously vulnerable to corrosion; it has also resulted in a
governmental structure with no rhyme or reason. The multi-state and
multi-agency manner by which we control and regulate the large
corporation is ridiculous. So is the fragmented, helter-skelter way in
which we enforce whatever is left of our policy against monopoly. The
hopeless morass which we deign to call our transportation policy is
notorious and appalling. 1 4 If we have a policy with respect to power,
electric or otherwise, I do not know what it is. I do not even know who
is in charge. I suspect it may not even be the industries! There is
some evidence that even so late an arrival as atomic energy is creating
problems. If these problems become serious, it will be because we have
been unwilling to do hard, honest, and realistic thinking about the
regulatory problems which that industry is beginning to pose. The
kind of problem posed by the recent Power Reactor Development Co.
litigation" strikes me as the inevitable by-product of our not really
knowing what sort of government-industry relationship we want. Nor
do we know what sort of atomic energy industry we want eventually
to develop. This is inevitably reflected in a compromising commission
attitude. And this is an attitude which is encouraged by a commission
structure combining the functions of public interest regulation, implying
a stern task-master, with industrial promotion, implying rather the
opposite.
We are thus confronted by a situation which is at least moderately
paradoxical. Having, for the sake of efficiency, developed the administrative process over the last half century or more, we now find that
process to be slow, uncoordinated, ineffective, and in some instances corrupt. Among the more prominent recent reactions to this condition is
the Landis Report.' 6 It detailed the present difficulties well enough.
And to some extent it focused upon their source. When it came to pre14

See the excellent study by Fui.DA,

-TRANSPORTATION

COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES

(i961); SPECIAL STUDY GROUP, SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTER-

STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 87TH CONG., iST SEss., REPORT ON NATIONAL TRANS-

POLICY (Comm. Print 1961);
Chase, The Crisis in Transportation, 26
THE PROGRESSIVE No. 3, P- 27 (March 2962).
1"Power
Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Elec. Workers,
AFL-CIO, 367 U.S. 396 (2961).
"' Report, op. cit. supra note 13.
PORTATION
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scribing remedies, the Landis Report spoke of the need for bigger and
better commission chairmen and for greater executive influence to achieve
development and coordination of policy. One does not, however, derive
a sense of radical reform from a reading of the Landis Report, which was
doubtless shaped by considerations of political feasibility. Even so, its
over-all impact has been less than a howling success, if not barely minimal. Several of the administration's reorganization proposals have
floundered or been accepted in part only. Progress at best may be
characterized, as modest. While this may be better than nothing, it is
hardly good enough.
The Landis position might be described as an intermediate one. It
recognizes the problem, points to the need for more vigorous executive direction, and makes moderate suggestions to that end. It
entails, however, a continued acceptance of our basic administrative
structure as it is. Thus the notion continues to be widely held
that the blending in the administrative agency of executive, regulatory, rule-making and adjudicatory functions and powers is necessary
and desirable, and that such separation of functions (especially of prosecuting and judging) should be accomplished internally within the
agencies and generally below the agency head level." The basis for
'? See, e.g., Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Proces: In Reply
to Mr. Hector, 69 YALE L.J. 965 (596o).
See also, Professor Davis' position with
respect to proposals to reorganize the Atomic Energy Commission. In opposing proposals which would split off from the Commission its regulatory function concerning
safety from its promotional and developmental activities, and would turn the former
over to a separate board with comprehensive regulatory authority, he has written:
"The proposed Board will have a brake but no accelerator and no steering wheel. The
AEC will continue to have all three-a brake, an accelerator, and a steering wheel, but
it will be discouraged from using its brake. Is a bus more likely to avoid accidents if
it has not only the usual driver with the usual control but also an extra operator with
only a brake? I think the man with the brake will tend to use it too much and at the
wrong time, and that the divided responsibility will increase the probability of accidents.
Accidents are avoided by using the accelerator and the steering wheel, not just by using
the brake, and especially are accidents avoided by the coordinated use of all three. In
the atomic program, some risks should be undertaken in order to learn how to avoid
accidents. Some risks should be undertaken in order to learn how to save lives; how
many lives have been saved by atomic contributions to medical science alone? Some risks
should be undertaken to further the developing science for benefits as yet undiscovered.
What cost in lives is too much for the development of an atomic-powered plane or missile
or earth satellite? If misuse of a brake brings crucial programs to a halt, the human
cost may be immeasurable.
"The regulatory powers should continue in the AEC, the present unitary command should
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this approach would appear to be the idea that implementation of
public policy requires such centralization. It might be observed that
some degree of "frustration and stalemate" is a price of ordered liberty
and that the price of fairness is perhaps some degree of inefficiency.
There is, I think, an important difference between the kind of inefficiency
consciously paid for as the price of a free system of government, and the
inefficiences unintentionally and unexpectedly caused by a method of
administration supposedly efficient but actually chaotic. In the first
instance we know what we are doing and can minimize the effect. In the
second case we do not know what we are about, and produce the opposite
of the intended result.
Beyond that, I question the basic premise that centralization of
function does result in efficiency. To the extent that the administrator is
concerned with questions of fairness, he will be distracted from vigorous
discharge of his executive, coordinating, planning and promotional functions. To the extent that he focuses upon the latter, he will necessarily
tend to discount fairness and risks. If he tires to focus upon all these
tasks, he will probably wind up discharging none of them well.
Drastic reforms are implicit in the position taken by the Hoover
Commission,"8 and by Louis Hector in his famous memodandum to
President Eisenhower."9 To some extent, both point the same way.
They assert that the commission as presently constituted, involves an
improper commingling of functions rendering the discharge of these
functions impossible. But the emphasis of the two positions is quite
different. The Hoover Commission recommends establishment of an
administrative court-a suggestion which, in general terms, I support.
But the Hoover Commission's principal concern is with judicialization
not be disturbed, and no new Board should be created."
ATOMic ENERGY,

87TH CONG.,

AEC REGULATORY PRoCE s

IST SESS., VIEWS AND

29, 32

STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON

COMMENTS ON IMPROVING THE

(Joint Comm. Print x961).

This particular issue has engendered considerable discussion.
HYDEMAN,

See, e.g., BERMAN AND

THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND REGULATING NUCLEAR FACILITIES

(196t), and the exchange between Professors Cavers and Davis in tso U. PA. L. REV.

330-92 (i96z). On the separation issue in general, Professor Davis' position appears to
be more complex, favoring somewhat greater separation than is required by sec. 5(c) of
the Administrative Procedure Act, but not as much as was recommended by the second
Hoover Commission. 2 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 13.0I-.1X (1958).
" COMMISSION ON

MENT (1953--955),

ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURE

(1955).
"9Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
YAL.E L.J. 931 (196o).
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as an end in itself. There is less concern with vigorous and effective
government and with how this can be achieved.
This, on the other hand, is the point of Mr. Hector's principal
emphasis. He suggests that the fusion of functions has produced a
paralysis which is fair neither to the regulated groups, who are interested in due process, nor to the public, which has a stake in the
firm development, enforcement, and coordination of policy. Mr.
Hector's position leads to a conclusion of startling simplicity: the
classical separation of governmental powers, quite apart from representing orthodox constitutional dogma, and despite the occasional inefficiencies and stalemates it entails, makes much operational and functional sense. It produces about as good a balance between fair government and effective government as can be achieved.
What does this suggest about the desirable shape of our regulatory
machinery? I can only sketch it out in desperate brevity. First, our
economic policy ought to be drawn into a coherent whole. This is
a legislative task. We should stop the process of ad hoc tinkering and
think seriously and hard about what kind of an economy we do want.
If we decide that we want a free and competitive market economy, we
should draw our economic policy code so that its principal thrust will
unequivocally be in that direction.
This is not to minimize the difficulties of this legislative task. It
can surely not be accomplished overnight. But two steps at least ought
to be taken by Congress. First, in considering any new regulatory
legislation, Congress ought to resolve basic policy issues on such elemental factors as protection versus competition, instead of leaving these
dangling in the form of vaguely and ambiguously worded delegations.
Second, difficult though it is, the job of commencing a major legislative
overhaul of our entire cluttered-up regulatory framework must be
approached and commenced. Only thus can we make a genuine start
on administrative reform, and only thus will Congress ever be able
to resume its proper role as a major source of our public law.
Next, we should arrange our executive and administrative branch
so that it can achieve a coordinated strategy for the enforcement of our
law and policy. At the minimum, this means scrapping our splintered
mode of anti-trust enforcement and of corporate regulation. It requires, also, more coordinated and centralized policy formulation in the
public utility areas of transport, communications, and power. It may
require the creation of a new cabinet post of the first rank. Such a
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cabinet member might be the Secretary for Industrial and Economic
Affairs, and might chair a Coordinating Commission, the members of
which would include heads of bureaus responsible for various parts of
the overall economic code. The commission should have general rulemaking authority over its constituent parts, and the chairman's relations
to the Secretaries of Labor, Commerce, and Treasury might be similar
to those established by the Defense Department merger among the
secretaries of that department.
Such focusing of executive power and responsibility would seem to
be essential to render rational coordination possible in the formulation
and vigorous execution of policy. It would not assure such a result.
But in the event of failure, responsibility could be much more easily
pinpointed than is true now, with administrative ineptitude hidden in
the shrouds of independent quasi-judiciality, making it impossible to
find the locus of responsibility anywhere. And such centralization of
executive power is justifiable not only on grounds of efficiency but also
on grounds of fairness and constitutionality, if it is accompanied by an
appropriate splitting off of the judicial function.
Hence-it is no accident that this is third-we should consider
the creation of an independent system of United States Administrative
Courts whose decisions would be subject to review by a United States
Court of Administrative Appeals. Thus, while functions of formulation
and enforcement of policy would be properly separated from those of
adjudication, the latter would be in the hands of a system of expert
tribunals.20 This would, I submit, result in increased rather than
diminished administrative effectiveness. Executive tasks could be. discharged unhampered by the inhibitions of administrative officials who
see themselves as quasi-judges. More imaginative experimentation
with shortened procedures on the part of administrative officials would
be a likely result. A more generous use of the rule-making power
"0Suggestions to similar effect have been made not only by the Hoover Commission, op. cit. supra note 18, and by Hector, supra note 19, but they have also
been advanced in SPECIAL STUDY GROUP, SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE AND
FOREIGN COMMERCE, 87TH CONG.,

IST SESS., REPORT ON NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION

(suggesting establishment of a Transportation Circuit
Court of Appeals); BERMAN & HYDEMAN, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND
REGULATING NUCLEAR FACILITIES (196i) (urging separation of regulatory from
executive and promotional functions of the AEC); KAuPEN & TUNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (196O) (proposing an Industrial Reorganization Commission and Economic Court to administer and apply antitrust polides); Schwartz, Administrative Justice and its Place in the Legal Order, 30 N.Y.U.L.
POLICY (Comm. Print 196i)

REV. 1390 (1955).
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probably would be made. This would be a result devoutly to be hoped
for in connection with many transportation policy problems and with the
formulation of basic rate formulae in such areas as, for example, the
regulation of natural gas prices. In these fields, as well as others, our
administrative process is at present encumbered by interminable trialtype proceedings entirely unsuited for resolution of what are essentially
quasi-legislative rather than quasi-judicial disputes. Yet all these
gains in efficiency could be achieved without loss of fairness, if at the
same time there were made available expert and independent judicial
review. Nor would there be need to fear excessive executive control if
Congress initially discharged its legislative duties with sufficient precision.
By now it will be dear that I am not inhibited by questions of
political feasibility! A few concluding observations are in order. The
kind of regulatory framework I have outlined involves, of course, the
very opposite of the day-to-day pragmatic tinkering so characteristic of
us. It requires, instead, a firm fix on constitutional principle, and clear
thinking about the sort of society and economy we want. On the last
point especially our voice has, I think, for some time been quite muffled.
It is my own view that we should determine that it is the free, competitive market economy which is at the core of our economic policy.
We should determine that achievement of this goal is in the public
interest. And we should determine that, where competition is unworkable, public interest regulation should aim for an approximation of
competitive results.
Much of our present drift and lack of clarity about the nature of
the public interest is, I believe, attributable to an increasing uncertainty
about these aims. This leads to a final point. It may well be that the
triangular kind of governmental scheme I have sketched is appropriate
only to a free society coupled with a free economy. It is perhaps no
accident that the regulatory commission typically has arisen to contend
with malfunctioning markets. But if we are giving up on the market,
we should say so. And in that case the commission system may become
the dominant form of governmental activity. It is, in that event, to be
preferred - over excessive executive dominance over all of society's
activities. A somewhat decentralized corporate-syndicalist form of industrial organization is probably better than Stalinization!
I Perhaps we shall move toward the system envisioned by Professor
Davis of "miniature republics," consisting of commissions and their
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labor-industry advisory committees happily cooperating in the administration of the industrial system. 21 In that event it might even be
nice to add a fifth wheel to the headless fourth branch in the form of an
Ombudsman,"2 who, if at all possible, should of course, be a professor!
The only question left would then be, sed quis custodiet ipsum proJessorem?"a
But if we do all this we should be quite dear in our minds that we
shall have largely abandoned the libertarian governmental and economic system we have professed in the past. If we are collectivists,
let us say so!
"' "The industry-committee system under the Fair Labor Standards Act may at some
future time become a forerunner of miniature republics operating in economic or
functional areas within frameworks laid down by the Constitution and by Congress." 1
DAVIS, ADMiINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.03 (1958). Some implications of such an
approach are explored in Hanslowe, Regulation by Visible Public and Invisible Private
Government, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 88 (196t).
22 Experimentation with this device has been urged by Davis, Ombudsmen in America:
Officers to Criticicize Administrative Action, io9 U. PA. L. REv. 1057 (196i);
Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Reform: Hardy Perennial, 48 A.B.A.J. 243
(t962).
". gratefully acknowledge my debt to Harry Caplan, Goldwin Smith Professor of
the Classical Languages & Literature, Cornell University, for assistance in adapting
to the .Situation at hand Juvenal's famous saw about problems of guarding the
guardians. Juvenal, Satire VI, Line 347-

